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A CRISIS OF FAITH & THE SCIENTIFIC
FUTURE OF PATENT THEORY
OSKAR LIIVAK†
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, utilitarian rationales have formed the
core foundation on which the United States patent system is
built. Yet, more than ever before, that foundation appears
untenably shaky. In 1958, the Senate hoped to gauge the
performance of the patent system. It tasked economist Fritz
Machlup with providing a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of
it.
Machlup undertook the project, filed the report, and
concluded with his now-famous assessment:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic
consequences, to recommend instituting [it]. But since we have
had [one] for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis
of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.1

Such indeterminate support surely caused concern but then
again, at least at that time, perhaps we just had not developed
the sophistication to make a full assessment. Indeed, as late as
1986, George Priest lamented that “[t]he ratio of empirical
demonstration to assumption in [patent] literature must be very
close to zero.”2 Maybe it was okay if the jury was out on the
patent system because maybe the data was still out, too.
†
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. © 2016 Oskar Liivak. For valuable
comments and suggestions, the author thanks Jeremy Sheff and the participants of
the St. John’s Intellectual Property Law Center’s symposium on Values, Questions,
and Methods in Intellectual Property.
1
See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (review written by Fritz Machlup) [hereinafter
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM].
2
George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual
Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 19 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr.
eds., 1986).
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Today, thirty years after Priest made those comments, a lot
has changed.3 Many researchers from law and from economics
have made it their life’s work to study and empirically measure
the patent system.4 Yet, despite that outpouring of effort, the
overall picture is, as put by Mark Lemley, “complicated.”5 We
still have no proof that definitively refutes or supports the
system, and we are still just “muddl[ing] through.”6 But now,
with all that effort expended, the ambivalence cannot be ignored.
What was once a nagging concern is now an inescapable alarm.
What to do and where to turn during a crisis is never easy.
Assessing our options certainly seems prudent. In his book
Justifying Intellectual Property, Robert Merges does just that. He
opens the book explaining, “Every time I . . . go looking for the
utilitarian footings of the field, I come up empty.”7 Rather than
drop support for intelletual property altogether, Merges leaves
behind its traditional utilitarian roots and instead aims to
understand and justify intellectual property as a “fundamental
right” as understood by Rawls, Waldron, Locke, and Kant.8 In
many ways, the book is his reaction to the current utilitarian
impasse. As he had been a scholar who often employed law and
economics rationales, that new, decidedly nonutilitarian focus
was surprising, and apparently it was surprising even to Merges
himself.9
In part in reaction to Merges’s comments, Mark Lemley
published a recent essay decrying any abandonment of
utilitarian foundations for intellectual property.10 His essay has
provoked something of a minor firestorm in the usually placid
world of intellectual property scholars.11 Lemley’s primary
concern with the shift from utilitarian arguments to more
3

Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328,
1332 (2015) (“In the past three decades there has been an unprecedented—indeed,
astonishing—outpouring of sophisticated empirical work on virtually every aspect of
IP law and innovative and creative markets.”).
4
See id.
5
Id. at 1334.
6
See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 80.
7
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 4.
10
See generally Lemley, supra note 3.
11
See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Lemley on Faith-Based IP (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/04/lemley-on-faith-based-ip.html
(cataloging the responses to the essay).
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fundamental rights is the lack of any limiting principles that will
produce a balanced compromise between disparate competing
interests.12 For him:
A utilitarian IP framework has a metric for deciding whether
we should give control over those terms to the people who claim
them. But if IP is a Right, granted to the first creator not for a
purpose but simply because they are first, it is hard to find a
similar limiting principle.13

Furthermore, Lemley supports utilitarian foundations over a
rights-based system because a rights-based approach is “not a
science[;] . . . it does not admit the prospect of being proven
wrong.”14 He added that he is trying to draw the line “between
theories of IP that are responsive to evidence and those that are
impervious to it.”15
It is Lemley’s call for a falsifiable, scientific utilitarian
theory that is the focus of this Essay. I wholeheartedly agree
that we should endeavor to provide such a utilitarian theory for
the patent system. But this Essay argues that this call is more
radical than it appears. If we want a proof-based system around
which consensus could grow, then we have to abandon the
incentive-focused, regulatory model that is today’s standard.
That theory is based on an “intractable cost-benefit analysis that
resists either justification or, alternatively, falsification.”16
Although clad in the trappings of a cost-benefit analysis, the
theory has no hope of ever being determinate, and accordingly, it
should be jettisoned. Try as we might, the framing of the patent
system as a market-skewing intervention inherently precludes
the theory from achieving the sought after falsifiability.

12
But see MERGES, supra note 7, at 159 (dedicating a significant portion of his
book to a central “Proportionality Principle” that puts bounds on intellectual
property and prevents “excessive” leverage).
13
See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1341. Though not the focus here, I disagree that
such nonutilitarian thinking leads inexorably to the ever increasing reach of
intellectual property. Elsewhere I have argued—along with my co-author Eduardo
Peñalver—that arguments based on autonomy, personhood, and efficiency all
provide limits for intellectual property. See generally Oskar Liivak & Eduardo
Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
1437 (2013).
14
Lemley, supra note 3, at 1346.
15
Id. at 1345.
16
Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOK. L. REV.
1335, 1337 (2013) [hereinafter Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity].
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Unsettling as this is, this failure of proof for the current
patent theory should not surprise us. Actually, we should be
surprised that we ever thought our current theory could be
justified. The fact is that we picked a pathologically defective
framing for our patent system. As is conventionally understood
today, the system is seen as exclusive rights that aim to reward
inventors so that they are “artificially” drawn into the world of
inventing.17 Patents are seen as a government mediated reward
to induce optimal amounts of inventive activity and that reward
is funded by taxing those that infringe the patent rights. This is
a foundational notion that, if noted at all anymore, is seen as
surely correct and uncontroverted.
But the current reward via exclusion framing is deeply
problematic. Once we start down that road, where the very
purpose is to distort private decision making, we have sealed our
fate and we are heading for unresolvable indeterminism. Our
inability to prove or disprove the utilitarian balance for such a
system was preordained by our framing.
With “artificial”
inducement as the stated goal, important utilitarian metrics are
taken off the table. The price system is not available to measure
and justify the patent system because we have purposefully
distorted it. It is no wonder that patent controversy has not been
resolved and that we are at best still just “muddl[ing] through.”18
This Essay takes aim at this inducement framing, and it lays
bare its pathologies, explaining that, by inducing invention, we
will not be able to make any meaningful assessments of the costs
and benefits of the system. There is no doubt that the business
of invention and innovation is complex, but by framing patents as
inducement we have made that job near impossible.
There are several fatal flaws with this understanding. First,
on a macroeconomic level, the inducement system requires
knowing how much invention or innovation society wants.
Certainly, most agree that we want some positive amount of
innovation, but beyond that, it is anyone’s guess. The designers
of an inducement-focused patent system need to know—at least
on a macro level—the optimal amount, but nobody has that
information. When someone is drawn away from otherwise
productive activity by the lure of the patent, how much has
17

DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 8 (2009).
18
See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 80.
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society lost?19 This design parameter is different in kind from
those needed in the rest of the economy. A central advantage of
the private property market is that we need not know such
relative allocations beforehand in designing the system. Instead,
they result from decentralized decision making based on the
price system. In short, inducement is generally not the central
design feature elsewhere in the economy. Instead, the amount of
activity in an industry is an output result of the neutral private
property platform.
Second, even if the optimum level of innovation is not
knowable ex ante, it perhaps could be identified through trial
and error. By selecting a random positive level, then measuring
the resulting costs and benefits, the level of innovation can be
adjusted to optimize the net benefit by trial and error. But this
is near impossible with the current inducement-framing system.
We do not have the tools to measure the costs and benefits on a
micro or macro level. Again, because the pricing of patent
transactions is no longer tied to alternate uses of scarce
resources, the costs and benefits of this system cannot be
calculated. The system as a whole remains without solid footing.
Third and lastly, though the overall balance is near
impossible to calculate, reward framing appears to involve real
costs without guaranteeing any real benefits. First, there is the
deadweight loss. Reward framing often leads to a fixation on
exclusion. It is thought that a proper patent reward generally
must exclude some from using the invention. Otherwise, the
patentee could not receive his proper reward. This limit on
access is the cost side of the famous incentive-versus-access
compromise that is at the core of intellectual property debates.
Excluding others is seen as necessary yet it also condemns the
system to incurring at least this deadweight cost.
In addition, this exclusion focus has its most pernicious
impact on actual innovators. The patent system allows patentees
to tax independent innovators even where the patentee has not
engaged in any attempts to commercialize. In short, actual
innovators are being taxed to provide tribute to patentees who
are often not innovating. Much of the “troll problem” can be seen
as aggresively leveraging this feature.
With inducement
19

See Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1
ECONOMICA 30, 41–44 (1934) (arguing that a subsidy vision of patents has nonzero
yet hard to quantify opportunity costs).
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framing, the dynamic costs are considerable.20 Innovation, where
new inventions are actually utilized, does provide real societal
benefits. But today’s inducement framing never requires that
patentees engage in any actual innovation.
In fact, the
incentives may be aligning against real innovators. Today,
noninnovators are increasingly taxing actual innovators. This
hardly seems like a system that can guarantee any societal
benefits. We know this framing is incurring real costs to society,
but we cannot be confident about any benefits.
So if inducement inherently introduces so many problems, is
it necessary? Is inducement the only way to frame the patent
system? This Essay argues, no, we do not need to induce and we
should not want to. There are other theories for the patent
system that do not fall prey to the same pathologies. Though the
goal still should be to “promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and
useful [a]rts,”21 we need not fulfill that goal by directly
subsidizing invention. Rather, a patent system should remain
agnostic as to participation. It should not try to induce people to
invent or innovate. Instead, the patent system should be a
neutral platform that is available for inventors to sell their
wares—that is, their inventions—to technology users. When
someone decides that the best use of his or her time is to invent
and sell the technology to others, then this platform should be
available for them. This allows private decision making to guide
participation. The system should be available to support those
that decide that they can create and sell a new invention to
enough people that the cumulative revenue makes inventing the
best use of their time and resources. Likewise, the system should
be available for technology consumers who decide to get new
technology when the utility from using the new technology
exceeds the value of the other things that could have been bought
with the requested licensing fee.
There are numerous
advantages of building our understanding of the patent system
around such a neutral technology transfer market.22
First, in this view, the patent system does not induce or
subsidize. Professional inventors and technology users will
employ the system when such an ex ante technological exchange
20
See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 262–63 (1994) (outlining the various costs of a patent system).
21
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
22
See Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, supra note 16, at 1353.
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inherently benefits both parties.
Importantly, because the
system is not aiming to distort or subsidize, then the price
system can operate to align private decision making with societal
decision making. In other words, the system is designed so that
private decision making aligns with society’s cost-benefit
analysis. Wherever a professional inventor can stay in business
by selling his or her inventions to others, then society will concur
that the creation and commercialization of that technology was
the best use of that inventor’s scarce resources. Importantly,
because it is a neutral platform, the design of the system does not
need to know the optimal amount of inventive activity ex ante.
The resulting amount of inventive activity is an output of the
system rather than a necessary initial input. We are not trying
to artificially divert people to this system. Instead, they will
participate when the best use of their time and scarce resources
is inventing and innovating.
In addition, with a technology transfer focus, deadweight
loss is a bug, rather than an unfortunate but necessary feature.
In the current inducement-via-exclusion framing, deadweight
loss is seen as an unfortunate but largely unavoidable feature.
As famously put by Kenneth Arrow, “In a free enterprise
economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention
to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is
successful, there is an underutilization of the information.”23
With an innovation focus, a potential user without access to the
technology is not an unfortunate, necessary feature, but rather a
market failure that should be remedied.
The following aims to expand and detail these arguments.
Part I provides the conventional incentive narrative for the
patent system. It lays out the ambiguous support for that system
and then it shows how that ambiguity derives in large part from
its framing as a system of inducement. Part II takes the
diagnosis from Part I and aims to build a patent system that
avoids those pitfalls. It describes a neutral system of ex ante
technology exchange. Importantly, such a system does not
induce, but rather enables such technology transfers by
regulating—and often prohibiting—the acts that would harm a
business model based on technology creation and transfer.
23

Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
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INDUCEMENT AND ITS PATHOLOGIES

This Part outlines the conventional inducement framing of
the patent system, then enumerates three of its major
deficiencies. First, the inducement narrative necessarily involves
determining ex ante the optimal amount of innovative activity
and the reward that will induce that activity. The parameters
for these critical functions are unknown. From the outset, this
system is based on unknown variables. Second, even admitting
that choosing an ex ante level of reward is guesswork, the
conventional framing precludes any cost-benefit assessment that
might allow a trial and error search that could converge toward
an optimum amount of innovative activity.
Lastly, the
inducement framing is fixated on exclusion. Though no one
celebrates excluding others as being desirable, the reward
framing sees exclusion as the necessary—and even tragic—price
for providing the incentives that induce.
A.

The Conventional Inducement Narrative

Most policy justifications for the patent system begin by
noting that the informational goods at the heart of the patent
system are inherently different than tangible goods. Once
created, an informational good can be copied rather easily.24 This
makes creation and sale of such goods complicated. Every
purchaser of the good can turn around to become a competitor.
Without some kind of regulation, copying and reselling—that is,
piracy—is too attractive. The worry is that, in such a world, too
few will risk investing scarce resources in such a tenuous
business model.
As a result, “[i]f we [do not] do
something . . . everyone will want to be an imitator, not an
inventor.”25

24
This has been emphasized for some time now. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas
Jefferson, President, U.S., to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (“[The] peculiar
character [of an idea] is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses
the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me. That ideas should freely spread . . . seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature . . . .”).
25
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 17, at 7–8.
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From those correct observations, though, the argument
moves quickly to the assertion that society must affirmatively
“encourage invention by rewarding inventors.”26 The patent
system is seen as “deliberate government interventions in the
market—a sort of mercantilist economic policy for artificially
stimulating innovation.”27 The reward aims to induce people to
invent. Patents give out “above-market rewards to creators of
certain works that would not be created, or not created as soon or
as well, in the absence of reward.”28 Within this discourse there
is debate surrounding what activities are to be rewarded and
what institutions are best situated to grant and manage the
reward, but the notion of inducing via a monetary reward is
surely agreed upon.
As to processes for administering the reward, there are a
number of choices. A reward to inventors could be administered
through a prize system, a grant system, a tax break system, or an
exclusive rights system. There is long-standing discourse on the
comparative advantages of these different modes.29 The United
States Constitution specifically enumerates that Congress should
promote progress via “exclusive [r]ight[s],”30 thus, much of the
discourse has largely remained focused on patents and their
exclusive rights. In recent years, there has been a notable
renaissance exploring these alternatives.31
In a prize system, a prize amount is chosen to induce the
optimal amount of innovative activity. As argued below, it is
generally unknown how much innovative activity is optimal or
how much reward is needed to induce that activity for a rewardfocused patent system, and the administration is slightly
different. The system still needs to determine the optimal level
of activity that the system aims to induce. Rather than turning
to the general treasury to fund the prize, the patent system funds
the patent reward by granting valuable rights of exclusion to the

26

Id. at 8.
Id.
28
MERGES, supra note 7, at 2.
29
See, e.g., Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents,
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1983); see also Fritz
Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J.
ECON. HIST. 1, 10–11, 19–20 (1950).
30
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31
See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2013).
27
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patentee. With these, the patentee taxes those that infringe on
the rights granted by the patent. The patentee “is thus ‘akin to a
private attorney general’ who, aided by the courts, goes forth and
scours the countryside collecting from infringers the tax that is
owed to him.”32
One advantage of this exclusionary prize system is that the
prize is adjusted automatically. Because the reward is realized
by taxing those who infringe the patented technology, the reward
varies based on the popularity and relevance of the patented
technology. If a patent covers important technology that many
want access to, then the patentee can recover a large reward via
patent exclusion. If the technology has no adherents or is of no
value, that will be reflected in its reward. This feature allows the
patent system to be a reward system wherein the reward is not
fixed beforehand to a set amount. The doctrine of claim’s scope
allows the system to reward patentees with larger prizes that
correspond to the merits of the “real contribution” of the inventor.
There is considerable debate over the exact acts that need to
be promoted, as well as what institution is best suited to do the
promoting. Despite the diversity of opinion, they have more in
common than is often admitted. For example, though an
exclusive rights system and a prize system surely have
differences in detailed implementation, they are both, at their
core, reward systems that aim to induce innovation and
invention. They both subsidize and thereby induce people to
engage in technological progress. The difference lies in how the
promised subsidy is defined and how the reward can be collected.
But even when we focus on inducement via exclusionary
rights, there is still a further debate over what particular acts
should be promoted. Generally, inventors and innovators aim to
advance science and technology. But within that broad area,
details are often murky and terms are used with imprecision.
The buzzwords of invention and innovation are often bandied
about interchangeably, but there are differences between the
two. As used here, invention relates to the act of conceiving a
technological solution to a particular problem. Discovering a
solution is certainly a positive step but achieving societal benefits

32

Oskar Liivak, Private Law and the Future of Patents, HARV. J.L. & TECH
(forthcoming 2017) (quoting Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law”
Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 532–33 (2014)).
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requires more than conceiving a solution alone.33 In general,
society benefits only when a technological solution is put into
practice. If someone conceives of a cheaper, better process to
produce something, that is great from the standpoint of human
knowledge, but real societal improvement only occurs when that
knowledge is put into practice. That act, taking technology that
has been invented and putting it into widespread practice, is
innovation.34 The distinction between invention and innovation
is relevant to the discussion of patent reward because there are
ongoing disputes about the exact act that should be rewarded.35
But even with the ongoing debates about what acts we are
trying to induce via a reward, there is agreed-upon logic
underlying these inducement framing of the patent theories.
Without doing something to help inventors, the “normal” market
will not consistently and regularly provide remuneration to
inventors for their efforts. Being an inventor will just not pay
the bills and fewer people will invent. The most obvious solution
is to simply make inventing more profitable to make up for the
shortfall.
In theory, the utilitarian accounting for this system is also
straightforward. The benefits are netted against the cost with
the hope that the results are positive. “The gains from this
scheme, in the form of new works created, are weighed against
social losses, typically in the form of the consumer welfare lost
when embodiments of these works are sold at prices above the
marginal cost of their production.”36 But as described throughout
this Essay, this task has proved to be quite hard in practice.37
33
Of course, there can be positive social benefits just from coming up with a
solution even before that solution is put in practice. Knowing that a problem has
been solved can spur others to look for alternate solutions within the same general
area. Furthermore, knowing how a problem was solved can spur others to apply the
same rationale to some related area. These are both beneficial spillovers that could
result simply from coming with a solution even before that technological solution is
put into widespread practice.
34
See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL,
AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 85 (1939) (stating that
invention alone without actual usage is “without importance to economic analysis”).
35
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
ECON. 265, 268 (1977); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703, 707 (2001); Mark A. Lemley,
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
129, 131 (2004).
36
MERGES, supra note 7, at 2.
37
See supra Introduction.
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Pathologies of Inducement

As argued by Hovenkamp and Bohannon, “finding the right
balance [for intellectual property] has proven to be one of the
most difficult questions that government policy has ever had to
face.”38 So far, there is no evidence that we are converging on a
solution to this challenge. Though this lack of justification is
dispiriting, it should not be surprising. A reward-based exclusive
rights system is pathologically defective. It aims to induce the
optimal amount of innovative activity. And we are simply not
equipped to design such a system. Though its utilitarian
contours are easy to define in theory, in practice, we have been
asking too much of ourselves. As noted by Merges, designing
such a system is “impossibly complex.”39 “Estimating costs and
benefits [in this system] . . . are all overwhelmingly complicated
tasks.”40
Whether the reward is mediated directly or through an
award of exclusive rights, at least at the macro level, such a
system needs to set the optimal amount of innovative activity as
an input to system design. But we just do not have the tools to
determine how much innovative activity society needs. Surely it
is a positive amount, but the exact positive amount is unknown.
Importantly, these types of determinations are not made for
other parts of the economy. Optimal amounts of activity devoted
to various industries and particular endeavors are the end
results of the private property-mediated market system. The
system produces those natural outputs; they are not required as
necessary informational parameters for system design. Even
though directly rewarding inventors may well seem like the
obvious way to implement a system “[t]o promote the [p]rogress
of [s]cience and useful [a]rts,”41 that framing puts an unknowable
parameter as a core design variable.
There are other related pathologies as well. It is conceivable
that if the system allowed for adjustment, the optimal amount of
innovative activity could be discovered by repeated trial and
error. But this, too, is impossible as we lack the means to assess
the costs and benefits of the system. Here, the pathology of the
38
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 404 (2012).
39
MERGES, supra note 7, at 2.
40
Id.
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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reward framing again rears its ugly head. Elsewhere in the
economy, critical decisions about how to use scarce resources are
generally made in a decentralized fashion, guided primarily by
the price system.42 Importantly, where the price system is
working, those observable price signals and transactions are tied
to the revealed consumer preferences for various uses of our
collective scarce resources.
Such beneficial metrics are not available with an
inducement-based patent system. They have been largely taken
off the table because the inducement system specifically distorted
them. Patents are trying to “artificially” inflate the value of
inventing. In such a world, the prices that are paid for patent
licenses bear no connection to a revealed preference between use
of the technology and the alternate uses of scarce resources.
Instead, as described above, a patent license is just part of a
larger scheme whereby the patentee collects the patent reward
by taxing individuals who knowingly or unwittingly infringe.
Without a functioning price system, it is near impossible to
measure either the costs or benefits of the system. The only area
where headway has been made is in calculating the private costs
of using the patent system by focusing on the legal fees
associated with the patent system.43 These audits of the patent
system are contested, but nonetheless, the existence of real
numbers and debate is an improvement. Sadly, that represents
but one aspect of the total costs and benefits of the patent
system, and thus, a fuller accounting is just not possible. Much
of the blame for that indeterminacy results from having framed
the system as a reward to induce.
In addition to these pathologies, the standard reward
framing puts an unnecessary and unfortunate focus on excluding
others as the hallmark of a properly functioning system. In the

42
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 292 (11th ed. 2010) (“[A] market system uses prices to coordinate economic
activity[, instead of centralized planning].”).
43
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 16 (2008) (“By almost any
interpretation, the United States patent system could not be providing overall
positive incentives for these United States public firms by the end of the 1990s. The
risk of patent litigation that firms faced in their capacity as technology adopters
simply outstripped the profits that they made by virtue of owning
patents. . . . Moreover, preliminary data for more recent years suggest that this
problem has gotten worse since 1999.”).
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conventional reward framing, the “natural” baseline for ideas has
them freely shared with prices set to marginal cost—therefore
close to zero. As famously put by Kenneth Arrow, “[A]ny
information obtained, say a new method of production, should,
from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart
from the cost of transmitting information). This insures optimal
utilization of the information . . . .”44 Echoing Justice Brandeis’s
eloquent views, ideas should be “free as the air to common use.”45
With a price set at zero, ideas will be able to spread, and
indeed, all can use the idea. Arrow, though, quickly interjects
that despite the appeal of this utopic public domain, such a
scheme would “provide[] no incentive for investment in
research.”46 No one would invest in producing ideas, because
there would be no ability to recoup the costs. Arrow then
suggests that a property rights system can fix this: “In a free
enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the
invention to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it
is successful, there is an underutilization of the information.”47
Arrow’s last statement gets at the core of the incentives versus
access paradox.48 In essence, we need to block access so that
price can be raised above marginal cost to ensure a positive
incentive to initially create—or commercialize—the work;
excluding some from use of the work is inefficient. At present,
the use of valuable societal resources is not being maximized.
This is the well-known, deadweight loss cost often discussed in
intellectual property debates.
The first two pathologies of the inducement system
addressed the lack of utilitarian tools for designing or assessing a
reward-based patent system. The exclusion fixation of the
reward theory is somewhat different but nonetheless still
damaging to any prospect of a stable, accepted system. The
reward via exclusion frame inherently leads to controversy
because it necessarily incurs a real cost. No one celebrates the

44

Arrow, supra note 23, at 616–17.
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
46
Arrow, supra note 23, at 617.
47
Id.
48
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 486 n.5 (1996).
45
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exclusion of others from use of a productive idea, but the reward
framing accepts this as an unfortunate but necessary feature of
the system.49
II. INNOVATION WITHOUT INDUCEMENT
In his book, Merges eludes to some of the impossibility
described above:
“[T]his complexity poses a major problem for utilitarian theory.
The sheer practical difficulty of measuring or approximating all
the variables involved means that the utilitarian program will
always be at best aspirational. Like designing a perfect
socialist economy, the computational complexities of this
philosophical project cast grave doubt on its fitness as a
workable foundation for the field.”50

I agree completely with Merges here but for one important detail.
He argues that this problem dooms “utilitarian theory.” I
disagree. It dooms the particular framing that we have chosen.
The above discussion focused on some key features of the
conventional reward framing for the patent system. That reward
system provides a perverse framing “that resists evaluation. We
cannot establish the overall costs or benefits of the system. We
cannot prove it is worth it, nor can we prove it is not. The system
just endures in a persistent indeterminate state.”51 We have an
unscientific system controlling a critical engine for economic
growth. If Lemley is serious in moving patent theory toward a
scientific footing, I hope he is ready to ditch that standard
incentive framing as well. I think it is the only way we can hope
to get there.

49
Some have pointed to the potential for price discrimination to help reduce
these deadweight losses and, indeed, where it can be employed, price discrimination
will help, but, where it cannot be used, the reward framing still accepts exclusion as
the proper outcome. See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual
Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream
Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 390, 422 (2006). In other words, because price
discrimination increases the share of surplus that goes to the patentee, patentees
have incentives to deploy price discrimination where they are able. If they cannot
deploy it effectively, then the reward framing accepts exclusion as the correct
outcome.
50
MERGES, supra note 7, at 2–3.
51
Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to Intellectual
Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2012) [hereinafter Liivak, Maturing Patent
Theory].
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As argued in this Essay, those problems stem rather directly
from the framing. Once it is decided that the purpose of the
patent system is to induce inventive activity by granting rewards
of valuable exclusive rights, the indeterminacy is baked in.
Rather than lament the quagmire, it should be surprising that
this system could have ever been justified on utilitarian grounds.
Given this dour assessment, perhaps the patent system should be
abandoned, or at least the utilitarian arguments in support of it.
Either would be an understandable reaction. Indeed, a number
of patent scholars are exploring both of these options. But there
is another possibility. Perhaps reward framing is not the only
way to structure a utilitarian-justified patent system. And if
there are alternatives, they should be explored. Moreover, as
argued above, reward framing fails because it entails too many
pathological features.
That failing suggests exploring
alternatives that lack these problematic characteristics.
A number of patent scholars have begun to work on a system
that has promise in this regard. Rather than focusing on
delivering a reward for invention, scholars have instead been
framing the patent system as the legal infrastructure that
enables technology creators to sell their creations to technology
users.52
A patent system based on enabling licensing of
technology from patentees to technology users has the potential
to provide the full basis for the patent system, as well as allow
for robust, consensus-building utilitarian justification for it.53 In
particular, this framing puts heavy emphasis on ex ante
licensing—actual technology transfer—and has little room for ex
52
See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST.
L.J. 473, 489 (2005) (arguing from a transaction cost perspective that “[t]he patent
form enables a potential transferor to share an information asset without fear of
misappropriation while assembling the complex team necessary to commercialize a
new product”); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1499 (2005); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent
Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2008) (arguing
that a transactional model “permit[s] the exposition of a model that need not rely on
ex ante assumptions about optimal R&D expenditures”); Liivak, Maturing Patent
Theory, supra note 51, at 1165; Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity,
supra note 16, at 1343; Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating
Standards for Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1076
(2013) (“As I will show, the modular theory of property points to a strong role for
commercialization concerns to shape intellectual property.”); Stephen Yelderman,
Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1566–67 (2016).
53
See Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, supra note 16, at 1357–
58 (2013); Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory, supra note 51, at 1182.
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post licensing.54 Notably, ex post licensing is the domain of
patent trolls and therefore this tech transfer framing provides no
support for the patent troll business model. Furthermore, this
framing can avoid the pathological pitfalls that have hampered
the reward theory.
Before exploring these solutions in more detail, it is worth
pointing out that Merges and Lemley both provide hints
suggesting that this direction may suit them. Merges explores
the impossibility of the regulatory incentive system and he
rightly compares its informational complexity to the impossibility
of “designing a perfect socialist economy.”55 This comparison
surely suggests the consideration of a patent system modeled on
private property and its system of exchange. That private
property system does not put impossible informational demands
on system design. This transactional theory is aiming to be
exactly such a theory in the realm of ideas. Similarly, though he
seems unwilling to admit it,56 Lemley also hints that private
property—and its attendant microeconomic theories—may
provide the starting point for fruitful solutions. After all, he
premises much of his arguments on “the fundamental discovery
that market mechanisms supplemented with some infrastructure
investment and health and safety regulation generally work
better than anything else in providing most goods and services.”57
But those markets and the theories of perfect competition that he
aims to protect are all predicated on a system of private property.
Perhaps an analog theory for patents that rightfully recognizes
the critical differences between rival and nonrival goods could be
a step in the right direction. Again, I think a transactional
theory of technology transfer can be such a theory.
A.

A Neutral Platform for Enabling Technology Transfer

The reward theory aims to draw people to the business of
inventing. Society worries that too few people will become
inventors and thus, the conventional framing takes the most

54
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 7–8, 31–72 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-noticeand-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf.
55
MERGES, supra note 7, at 3.
56
See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1345.
57
Id. at 1330.
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direct approach to getting people to become inventors. Yet, as
explained above, the direct approach leads to numerous
unresolvable problems. The alternative technology transfer
regime takes a less direct approach. It does not explicitly aim to
make inventing a profitable activity for all inventors. Rather, it
simply provides the legal platform upon which inventors can sell
their technologies to users. As a platform, it is largely agnostic
about how many people should take advantage of marketing
inventions to users. In other words, it does not aim to induce.
Accordingly, such a system need not know beforehand—or even
later to optimize it—how much inventive activity is optimal.
Potential inventors and potential technology users will
themselves decide when to use this platform.
B.

Exclusivity Not Exclusion

As a patent system that emerges from the Patent and
Copyright clause, the mode of “promoting progress” is limited to
“exclusive rights.”58 In the reward theory, those rights are
designed to exclude others from access. For some, the right to
exclude is tied directly to the constitutional mandate.59 And
certainly the right to exclude is seen by many as the fundamental
defining characteristic of property systems.60 Yet, other property
scholars have offered an alternative understanding. Property
should focus on exclusivity rather than exclusion.61
For
intellectual property that means focusing not on excluding others
as is inherent in the reward framing, but instead to understand
the intellectual property owner as holding an exclusive position
in regards to the work in question. For the technology transfer
framing of the patent system, this exclusive position of the patent
owner should be understood as the right—and obligation—to be
the exclusive supplier of the patented invention to users of the
invention.

58

Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory, supra note 51, at 1180, 1185.
See Roger Milgrim, An Independent Invention Defense to Patent Infringement:
The Academy Talking to Itself: Should Anyone Listen?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 295, 297–98 (2008).
60
See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 730 (1998).
61
Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J.
275, 275 (2008).
59
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Focus on Value of Use of Invention, Not Value of Exclusion

Inventors will devote scarce resources to inventing when
they believe there is a large enough market for the invention that
the cumulative ex ante licensing revenue exceeds the opportunity
costs of those consumed scarce resources. In other words, people
will invent when it is their best option. Likewise, technology
users will come to this market to get the new technology where
the private value of using the new technology exceeds the value
of the other things that could be bought with the asked-for
licensing fee. The utilitarian justification is straightforward. If
an inventor can stay in business by selling his or her inventions
to others, then society concurs that the creation of the technology
is the best use of scarce resources.
CONCLUSION
The current reward framing for the patent system has
resisted all attempts to either confirm or to refute the benefits of
the system. Yet that should not surprise us. We should be
surprised that we ever thought that the system could be justified
at all. The reward framing has infected the patent system with
pathological defects that make the system both unjustifiable and
unfalsifiable. An alternate framing that focuses on ex ante
technology transfer can support and explain many of the
doctrinal features of the current patent system, but it can do so
while avoiding the pathologies that plague today’s patent theory.

